At the time of writing, the G7 finance ministers reckon total global losses due to sub-prime loans to be in the region of $400bn, according reports in The Financial Times – several times more than the initial estimates.

The FT also reported that the finance ministers of the G7 countries are therefore discussing a co-ordinated regulatory response to weaknesses in the global financial system. This is, of course, one of their important roles in life and it is not an easy one. Different economic and political agendas across the globe probably complicate the beefing up of treaties on regulation of international financial markets. There is nothing new in that, but the landscape has evolved in important ways that, I suggest, require more than better early warning systems and regulation of ratings agencies – just two of the measures that have been mentioned.

With the exception of the BIS capital adequacy requirements of the Basel 2 regulations, practically all financial service regulators focus on their own jurisdictions and borders. They are concerned with the integrity of domestic business and the security of deposits and customers in their own backyards, and they look to financial policy mechanisms to achieve their aims. This is understandable but increasingly risks to the global financial system stem from factors outside the control of individual regulators and the information systems under their control.

Most financial service regulators in major markets have long recognised the critical role played by computer systems, and the need for minimum standards of care - such as system security and assurance - by IT management. But what might not have been recognised so clearly is the extent to which the major global players now depend upon computer and communications systems located and operated in several countries and jurisdictions to carry out even apparently straightforward transactions. They are dependent on global communications networks that span many service providers and pass through numerous countries. The total risk profile of some services extends beyond the reach of any one regulator or company. Meaningful regulation of these IT services requires stronger and consistent international regulation that spans political boundaries.

The end-to-end delivery of some services - particularly fast-moving critical activities such as trading and payments - often employs systems owned and managed by several players in collaboration. In some respects, the risks to the global financial system depend on how well management can understand and track the cumulative global behaviour of these complex arrangements, and how well we understand how to respond if the exceptional occurs. Are international information systems capable of signalling when global risks are changing, and do they provide the detail required to underpin co-ordinated global effort to reign in potential problems before they get too big? Is this area on the agenda of the G7 finance ministers when they meet? If it is not I suggest it should be – it justifies serious study.

The House of Commons Treasury Committee report on Northern Rock raises concerns at how well the financial strategy of Northern Rock was stress-tested against the possibility that its credit supply chain would change unexpectedly. It discusses the challenge of assessing the real likelihood of apparently improbable circumstances that cause business plans to go awry. Some of the comment on recent difficulties in world credit markets centres on the difficulty of identifying where the problems lie, which businesses will bear the pain and how big the figures will be. How much more complex is the challenge of stress-testing scenarios for global financial markets, and how much more serious could be the consequences of misjudgement?

These are questions about business information risk management, and for the way we go about managing international information driven businesses. We hear about increased interest in end-to-end risk management of complex business processes, and that can only be a good thing. However, I wonder if we realise just how far apart some of the ends really are, and how many players make up the chain that connects them.

Perhaps it would be appropriate for international organisations such as the Bank for International Settlements or the Institute of International Finance, and the academic world, to take a closer look at the role of technology for global risk monitoring, and at the policy options. A report to the next G7 summit would not be out of place.